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  Forty-five minutes later the order came through on the FO’s radio to withdraw. Sgt Plummer wrote down the short message and immediately handed it to Harwick, who continues, “I took this instruction as a legal means to do what I knew had to be done and ordered the withdrawal at 1330hrs, keeping the transcript as ‘evidence.’ Of the five tanks remaining [from the original taskforce of 15] I could locate crews for only two. My troops took over and drove two more. The disabled Sherman outside the CP was set ablaze and a 5-minute fuse put on what little ammunition remained. It was hoped that the resulting explosion would bring down the remnants of the church and block the road behind us [which failed].” First to depart were 1st Lt Mehosky and C Co, who had orders to push forward at all costs with a ramshackle convoy of four Shermans. One of the tanks was crewed by Mehosky’s men, who had also commandeered a half-track, a truck, and a jeep.

  “The tank destroyers with A Co formed the rearguard to prevent the Germans from following,” recalls Bob Harwick. “The continuing heavy fog gave us much-needed cover and we set off as soon as the remainder of the wounded were loaded. Before long we could hear gunfire coming from the first group.” As the last half-track left Noville a long burst of enemy machine-gun fire came ripping across the fields from somewhere over to the right, followed by direct and accurate artillery fire from the left (east). Jay Stone and the team from the 321st were traveling with Harwick and sent a “mobile” fire mission to Savy. While this was being processed the major ordered his column to leave the road and hide in the marshy dead ground to the west. “Our fire mission was successful enough for the column to continue,” recalls Stone, “but the half-track in which we were now traveling kept getting stuck in the mud so we decided to make the rest of the journey on foot.”

  At the head of the first column, the lead tank had been hit on the approach to Foy but Harwick could not stop to help the crew who happened to be the volunteers from C Co. Meanwhile, supporting the withdrawal on the north-eastern edge of the village was another Sherman that had forced its way through the back of the Klein house and was now actively engaging enemy targets between Foy and Noville.

  “Moments later, I sent a ‘platoon’ to the left (east), who quickly ran into trouble while I led about 30 men to the right toward 3rd Bn,” recalls Maj Harwick. “Across the open fields from the road, tracer rounds from our machine guns set fire to one of the barns, and then killed a number of enemy troops as they emerged.” During the chaos several 1st Bn soldiers were wounded by friendly fire emanating from 3/506. “We captured 32 prisoners including a major,” continues Harwick. “Luckily the enemy troops pulled back, leaving the road clear through Foy. Our task force filed past me and began to regroup. With disheveled faces and torn, mud-caked clothing, the men had been through a tough couple of days, but they knew they had done a good job. Of the 600 who had originally gone into Noville, less than 400 now remained to tell the tale.”

  Jay Stone and the FOs arrived in Foy behind 1st Bn, with three German prisoners. “I eventually found our Liaison Officer, Capt Sam Skinner, who was working with 3/506 and handed him my POWs. Shortly afterwards, Lt Eugene Brooks from A Battery (who was seriously wounded the following day) took over our team, which had just been re-assigned to Col Patch.”

  By 1700hrs 1/506 had moved into a complex of barns around Blaise Farm (today called Sibret) at Luzery (recently vacated by 2nd Bn) on the outskirts of Bastogne as regimental reserve, where a couple of hours later they welcomed a hot meal, donuts, and coffee – although everyone wondered where on earth the food had come from.

  Retaking Foy

  As S/Sgt Frank Padisak was now the most senior rank in 1 Ptn H Co, it was up to him to gather the remaining squad leaders and assign them to their respective lanes of attack alongside I Co. After Stroud and Smith were evacuated, “the Slovak” flatly refused a recommendation from Capt Walker for a battlefield commission (BC). Frank had previously been put forward for a BC in Holland at the same time as Don Zahn, but he later discovered it had been blocked (probably by Walker – although Frank was never able to substantiate this). The Slovak was an immense asset to 1 Ptn and his patrolling, field craft, and weapon handling skills were instinctive.

  Hank DiCarlo recalls:

  Our platoon was told to move forward with two squads down into Foy, with mine nearest the main road which was just over on my right. Sergeant Patterson and his 60mm mortar squad were to stay in the eastern finger of woods along with a couple of machine-gun teams to provide fire support. The attack started around 1100hrs, and advancing down the hill we came under immediate small-arms and automatic fire. Firing all our weapons, we reached the first outbuildings and began to push the enemy back. Breaking into smaller groups we systematically cleared each house, barn, and shed, leapfrogging between positions. T/5 Bill Gordon, who had been with us through Normandy and Holland, became the first casualty. I stopped to check but he was dead. Before moving onward, I took a pair of field glasses from his body.

  Bill Gordon was a good-looking Jewish boy from a large family who always shared his care packages. After his death the Gordons continued to send parcels of sweets and sundries to the platoon.

  “With the help of two tank destroyers from the 705th TD Bn,” continues DiCarlo, “we drove the Germans back a couple of hundred yards into the fields north of Foy, clearing the main road in front of 1st Bn, who were now ‘attacking’ from the north.”

  Harold Stedman and Wayman Womack found themselves in front of their own rifleman when they came under fire from one of the buildings. The two mortar men took cover behind a wall and launched most of their 60mm rounds at the house. Just after Stedman sent Womack back for more ammunition, 1st Lt Don Replogle arrived with the rest of 3 Ptn. For a few minutes, sniper fire from the house held everything up until Womack returned with another ten shells, as Stedman remembers:

  Within a minute or two we were down to our last three rounds and it was my turn to get some more. As I crossed a small opening between two barns a bullet clipped my ear. Instinctively I threw myself on the ground and played dead for a few moments before attempting to move again. When I got back to Womack, the platoon had taken the house, killing three enemy soldiers. Two others were taken prisoner, one of whom was an officer. This guy was tall and looked mean and for some reason the boys thought he was the sniper who had just been shooting at us. The Kraut, who turned out to be Prussian, was refusing to put his hands in the air so I ran over and kicked him hard in the backside but he still refused to comply. One of the boys roughed him up and then asked the lieutenant if he could “take him to the coast” and was told under no circumstances was anyone going to shoot the man just for being arrogant.

  3 Ptn H Co were in reserve and anxiously watching the first tank destroyer (belonging to the C Co group) as it ran into the German roadblock on the outskirts of Foy. “The Sherman was hit and immediately caught fire and I distinctly remember being horrified as the ‘crew’ scrambled for their lives through the flames,” recalls Andros. During the battle the schoolhouse was hit and burned to the ground. Finally, around 1500hrs, the lead elements from C/506 were seen fighting their way toward 3rd Bn. Hank DiCarlo recounts: “As they passed through our lines, I saw my old platoon leader, 1st Lt Mehosky, for the first time since Normandy. ‘Moose’ was his old self, totally composed and in full control of the situation. That day our joint forces destroyed over 20 enemy tanks and vehicles from 2.Panzer-Division and captured 113 prisoners, mainly from Volksgrenadier-Regiment 78. It was estimated that we inflicted casualties of up to 60 percent among the attacking force.”

  After consolidating, the battalion dug in a few yards north of the road to Recogne and waited for further orders. That night, hourly patrols were sent out to the 502nd. 2nd Bn did the same with the 501st. By 1730hrs LtCol Strayer’s men were comfortably holding the eastern sector. 1st Lt Oswald and 2nd Lt Stapelfeld from 1 Ptn F/506 moved into the immediate area west of the railway embankment, while F Co established its CP at Detaille Farm. Locking in with Lt Richey
and 3 Ptn, Ben Stapelfeld covered his sector along the road with two machine guns and a 60mm mortar, while 2 Ptn acted as security for a detachment of guns from the 321st GFA.

  Ed Shames and the patrols platoon were assigned a sector alongside the Foy/Bizory road on the far northwestern edge of the Bois Jacques. The new area was close to the quarry where 2 Ptn H Co had previously held the line. “All I had at the time was a map of Foy I’d drawn by hand during our pre-deployment briefing,” recalls Ed. “Thankfully the proper 1:50,000 maps were issued shortly afterwards.” This area of the Bois Jacques was scattered with bricks belonging to an old hunting lodge that had been blown up by the Belgian Army in 1940. The forest partially overlooking Foy was to be Ed’s “front room” and patrol base for the next two weeks. It is interesting to note that today, in 2014, the woods east and west of the Bizory road have been cut back, leaving a more exposed and open landscape. In 1944, the area occupied by 3 Ptn extended further northwest – as did the woods on the eastern side of the road which were then occupied by the enemy. Also of note is the fact that during World War II the forest directly behind Ed’s position extended all the way back to the N30 – which afforded the platoon safe passage to 3rd Bn’s CP and Main Line of Resistance (MLR). For the most part Shames took his orders directly from Regiment:

  Usually each afternoon I’d be briefed in the Jacques’ Woods for the upcoming evening by either Maj Hester, Capt Leach, or Capt Gene Brown (CO Regt HQ Co). With things like listening patrols they’d give me a set of grid references that needed investigating. It wasn’t unusual for us to have several three-man teams in Recogne and Foy on any given night. Generally I would lead one team while Sgt Darrell “Shifty” Powers, Pfc Robert “Popeye” Wynn, Earl McClung, “Skinny” Sisk, and Cpl Walter “Smokey” Gordon would take the others. Combat patrols were a different thing altogether and usually numbered around six people and were required to capture enemy soldiers for interrogation. My mortar sergeant, Paul “Hayseed” Rogers [who took over after Sgt Clarence “Crash” Tridle was wounded], would often remain behind in the bivouac area to oversee our defenses. Several of my guys were fluent in German, such as my armorer T/5 Forrest Guth, Rod Strohl, and Ed Stein.

  For the most part “Hayseed” worked with our platoon sergeant “Buck” Taylor and handled the base area administration and also the passwords for any checkpoint or OP that we would be encountering. S/Sgt Taylor had real authority and would have made one heck of an officer. This allowed me more time to concentrate on mission preparation and planning. Paul would often select the men for our patrols and made sure each individual was prepared for whatever job he was expected to do. Before leaving the area our guys would go through patrol order, hand signals, time limitations, and immediate actions for emergency RVs which we called “marking.” Rogers and Taylor did everything expected of an officer and more – the only difference was that the men didn’t have to call them “Sir.”

  Lt Richard Hughes was a wealthy and exceptionally well connected New Yorker who had been originally posted to 2 Ptn as 1st Lt Lynn “Buck” Compton’s assistant. “I believe that his grandfather had been Governor and later Chief Justice to the US Supreme Court,” recalls Ed. “During those first few days we began to notice alcohol on his breath, and when challenged, he openly admitted to drinking on duty. This to me was totally unacceptable behavior and couldn’t be tolerated. So I knew he had to go at the first available opportunity.”

  G Company – the western sector: “Are we army or are we West Point!”

  1st Lt Frank Rowe from 2 Ptn G Co had not performed well in Normandy, where he gained the title “Foxhole.” West Point Military Academy graduate Turner Mason Chambliss had been the original platoon leader and had died on June 6 at the footbridge near Brévands. Lt Chambliss was a hard act to follow but eventually Rowe proved himself in Holland and was now a well respected and more than capable combat leader. “Rowe’s assistant, 2nd Lt Sherman Sutherland, was a great guy who had won a BC and took time to listen to the enlisted men,” recalls Jim Martin. When the enemy hit the G Co positions at dawn that first morning, 1st Lt Chester Osborne and 1 Ptn bore the brunt of the assault and 2 Ptn were sent across to assist. Pfc Ewell Martin and three other soldiers carried 1st Lt John Wiesenberger up the hill to the aid station.

  The XO was mortally wounded and died later that same afternoon. Artillery accounted for most of the casualties suffered by the company on December 20. Sgt Andrew Hobbs and Pvt Joseph Laviolette both later succumbed to their wounds. Among the more seriously injured were Cpl Lester McNickle, privates first class Stan Davis and Ernie DeGarmo, and privates Clyde McCarty and Robert May.

  During one of their first recon missions into Recogne – or the “Twilight Zone” as it came to be known – G Co had been tasked to make contact with H/502, as Jim Martin remembers: “Sergeant Bill Anderson (who was later wounded by shrapnel) and I had been manning the 60mm mortar, so we already had a pretty good idea regarding the terrain in front and to the left of us.” G Co was defending a line that ballooned out to the northeastern edge of Recogne with everything to the west under the control of the 502nd, or so they thought. “As we didn’t have much time, I suggested to 2nd Lt Sutherland that the others “stay put and wait” while the pair of us went forward to scout around the edge of the village. A regular officer would never have let me talk to him like that but Sutherland knew the score and was happy to accept my judgment. However, when the lieutenant and I moved westwards into Recogne the 502nd were nowhere to be found, and the mission took far longer than expected as we unsuccessfully tried to locate them.” Lt Fitzpatrick assigned John Kilgore and Albert Gray for OP duty in Recogne, as Kilgore recalls: “Because Fitzpatrick knew Albert and me from the football team, it seemed to us that we were always the first people he picked if something needed doing. The following night we were sent out on patrol, and I remember saying before we headed off, ‘Jesus Christ, Lieutenant, will you please learn someone else’s name!’ Albert Gray went missing during a night patrol on January 2, 1945, and we later learned that he’d been captured and then murdered several months later in Germany.”

  Directly behind G Co, lined by tall beech trees, was the Route Madame, marking the extreme western edge of the company area. The unmade road coursed downhill for about 600 yards to a beautiful farmhouse surrounded by five barns recently abandoned by the Degives family. Extending for about 250 yards and descending from the ridge alongside the Route Madame was a shoulder of woodland that would later become part of a permanent MLR for the company.

  “After that initial patrol, I heard Sutherland was actually disciplined by Col Patch for not paying attention to his specific time limitations,” recalls Jim Martin. “I suppose Sherman chalked it down to experience, but I know the information he provided meant that the gap was temporarily plugged until the 502nd could fully deploy.” Although partially overlooked by the Château d’Hoffschmidt (which became the CP for H/502 until the end of December) Recogne was destined to become a no-man’s land that could only be patrolled at night by either side.

  * The Germans had rebuilt the bridge over the railway after it was blown up by the Belgian Army in 1940. A short distance to the south along the tracks was the impressive terminus Gare du Sud. The railway system linked Bastogne’s two stations: Gare du Sud to Libramont and Gare du Nord to Gouvy (through Bizory). Located at the eastern end of the bridge adjacent to a huge concrete water tower was the Hotel du Sud. The hotel acted as a tram stop where the single-lane track turned northwest through 90 degrees before continuing over the bridge along Route de Marche to Marche-en-Famenne.

  4

  “Epitaph for a generation”

  December 21–24, 1944

  The LOD at this time was no more than one man deep, and at 0330hrs the following morning 3rd Bn again came under attack. Enemy armor advancing down the N30 was met with bazooka fire and some well-placed rounds from the two Sherman tanks still attached from the 705th TD Bn. Sgt Harley Dingman and 3 Ptn I Co were alerted by an unidentifi
ed patrol moving toward them:

  We weren’t quite sure who they were but had our suspicions. Immediately, I issued a challenge and asked for the password. It quickly became apparent that these soldiers were wearing hobnailed boots, but then an American voice responded from the darkness, “It’s Lt Smith for Christ’s sake; let us through.” I hesitated for a split second and gave the order to open fire before picking up a loaded bazooka. Pulling the trigger, I was knocked off my feet and engulfed by fragments of flying masonry. In the panic I’d forgotten about the brick wall directly behind me. The blast pitched me forward, causing a partial malfunction, and the rocket barely made it across the road before exploding! Needless to say my guys were not impressed but we managed to disperse the enemy troops in our sector.

  Due to the encirclement, the artillerymen had to conserve ammunition and were only permitted to fire on specific targets, such as the one described here by Jim Martin: “Before the battalion pulled out of Foy, we called in fire support, when through a gap in the fog I spotted a group of enemy soldiers moving into the village. The Germans paid dearly when the brief but effective bombardment blew them into oblivion.” Because of the heavy mist, dozens of Volksgrenadiers, supported by a few tanks, succeeded in entering Foy. In several instances where the Germans had actually penetrated across the G Co LOD, 1 Ptn were forced to fix bayonets and fight hand to hand. At 0600hrs the order came for the company to withdraw into the Bois Champay. Before pulling out, 1st Lt Osborne asked 20-year-old acting sergeant Stan Clever and his squad, including replacements Pvt James “Dewey” Meriwether and Ewell Martin, to remain behind and cover the maneuver. Manning his machine gun, Stan Clever bravely continued firing at close range into the shadowy figures emerging from the mist. Clever and his squad held on for as long as they possibly could before making their way through heavy small-arms fire back to the edge of the tree line.